Morton Filters for Superior Template Protection for Iris Recognition by Raja, Kiran B. et al.
Morton Filters for Superior Template Protection
for Iris Recognition
Kiran B. Raja†‡ R. Raghavendra‡ Sushma Venkatesh‡ Christoph Busch‡
† The Norwegian Colour and Visual Computing Laboratory, NTNU - Gjøvik, Norway
‡ Norwegian Biometrics Laboratory, NTNU - Gjøvik, Norway
{kiran.raja; raghavendra.ramachandra; sushma.venkatesh; christoph.busch} @ntnu.no
F
Abstract—In this work, we address the fundamental performance is-
sues of template protection for iris verification. We base our work on
the popular Bloom-Filter templates protection and address the key chal-
lenges like sub-optimal performance and low unlinkability. Specifically,
we focus on cases where Bloom-filter templates results in non-ideal
performance due to presence of large degradations within iris images.
Iris recognition is challenged with number of occluding factors such as
presence of eye-lashes within captured image, occlusion due to eyelids,
low quality iris images due to motion blur amongst many other. All of
such degrading factors result in obtaining non-reliable iris codes and
thereby provide non-ideal biometric performance. These factors further
directly impact the protected templates derived from the iris images
when classical Bloom-filters are employed. To this end, we propose
and extend our earlier ideas of Morton-filters for obtaining better and
reliable templates for iris. Morton filter based template protection for iris
codes is based on leveraging the intra-class and inter-class distribution
by exploiting the low-rank iris codes to derive the stable bits across the
iris images for a particular subject and also analyzing the discriminable
bits across various subjects. Such low-rank non-noisy iris codes enables
realizing the template protection in a superior way which not only can be
used in constrained setting, but also can be used in relaxed iris imaging.
We further extend the work to analyze the applicability to visible spec-
trum iris images by employing a large scale public iris image database -
UBIRIS (v1 and v2), captured in a unconstrained setting. Through a set
of thorough experiments, we demonstrate the applicability of proposed
approach and vet the strengths and weakness. Yet another contribution
of this work stems in assessing the security of the proposed approach
where factors of Unlinkability is studied to indicate the antagonistic
nature to relaxed iris imaging scenarios.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the growing need for secure access control in many domains,
biometrics has been employed as an ubiquitous way to identify
and verify the identity of subjects. Among the well used biometric
characteristics such as face, fingerprint, iris, palmprint etc., iris
recognition has been preferred way for highly secure applications.
The iris patterns begins to form during the third month of gestation
and the structures creating it’s striking patterns are developed
by the eighth month [24], [46]. Despite the pigment accretion
continuing in the postnatal years, the layers of the iris have
both ectodermal and mesodermal origin, consisting of dilator and
sphincter muscles, a vascularized stroma, and an anterior layer
with a genetically determined density of melanin pigment granules
This is an extended work of our earlier submission to BTAS-2019 [23].
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Fig. 1: Bloom Protected Templates for two subjects for multiple
samples from CASIA v4 Distance Dataset [1]. Note the iris code
is not consistent across multiple samples for same subject and
therefore the Bloom templates obtained are not consistent. Further,
a high number of same bits are set for bloom templates for both
subjects leading to high number of false accepts.
[7], [18]. A combination of all of these factors results in a complex
visible iris pattern displaying distinctive features such as arching
ligaments, crypts,ridges, and a zigzag collarette[7] making it a
unique biometric feature with low probability of impostor collision
[7], [5].
With the proven statistical analysis and it’s impeccable ac-
curacy, iris recognition has seen large scale deployment in var-
ious secure access control applications [5], [6]. The large scale
deployment of iris recognition has in turn resulted in systems
that capture iris patterns from same set of people across various
services and sectors ranging from private entity operations to gov-
ernment controlled border crossing (e.g., passenger management
in Schipol, Netherlands and immigration control in United Arab
Emirates), civilian ID management (e.g., Aadhar card manage-
ment in India). Unlike the passwords, when the biometric data
in plain form (e.g., iris images) is stolen, it cannot be replaced
due to inherent limitation of any person having limited amount
of biometric characteristics. This specific problem has led the
biometrics research towards a new direction where approaches
were proposed to store the features from biometric modalities
rather than in plain image domain. Further, to avoid the misuse of
database compromises, it was also proposed to protect the features
extracted from the biometric modalities. An implicit requirement
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2in biometric systems is therefore to compare the biometric features
in protected domain in the modern day systems.
Considering such a demand within biometric systems,
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 committee [19] has standardized the need to
protect the biometric features under Biometric Template Protection
[32], [39], [37], [38], [42], [13], [14]. This standard is further
aligned to the newer guidelines from the European General Data
Protection Regulations (EU-GDPR) [43] which demands the strict
need for privacy preservation and data protection. The three
fundamental requirements of template protection respecting the
ISO standards and GDPR are irreversibility, unlinkability and
revokability which are briefly discussed below. The concept of
irreversibility is to enforce that the biometric features in the
protected domain will not lead to reconstruction of biometric
sample that can lead to either direct or indirect association
with a subject. Number of works have underlined this need by
demonstrating ability to reconstruct biometric samples when the
features are not stored in protected manner for iris [10], face [20]
and fingerprint [9]. Secondly, the unlinkability ensures that any
subject using two different services with same biometric biometric
modality should not be identified by linking the protected features.
The specific challenge of linking of biometric templates across
two services compromises the integrity of biometric systems as
shown in recent work [14]. Thirdly, the concept of revokability
ensures the mitigation measure when the biometric systems are
compromised. It is therefore required that the template protection
scheme can revoke and replace the protected templates if a such
a need should arise. Apart from the three regulations, it is also
needed to ensure that the performance of biometric system is not
not degraded due to template protection mechanism itself.
Motivated by such factors, a number of works have been
reported in the recent past for achieving biometric template protec-
tion for various modalities[32], [39], [37], [38], [42], [13]. Given
the focus of this work, we limit ourselves to template protection
schemes for iris recognition. We first note a number of template
protection schemes proposed for iris recognition considering the
wide scale deployment [33], [39], [38], [42], [13] and then
briefly review the existing template protection schemes for the
iris recognition. Subsequently, we identify the set of unsolved
challenges for template protection within iris recognition in the
section below.
1 .1 Related Works
A brief overview of the state-of-art template protection schemes
proposed in the recent works is first reviewed in this section.
As it can be noted from the Table 1, most of the works on the
iris template protection are focused on the Near-Infra-Red (NIR)
domain and further the data employed for validating the previously
proposed template protection corresponds to constrained capture
setting (a summary of state-of-art works are presented in the
Appendix of this article). While noting these two factors, we also
note that the accuracy of most of the proposed approaches are very
high as a direct consequence of data stemming from constrained
setting. In another direction, we make another observation that a
number of recent works have been inspired by the recently pro-
posed Bloom-Filter based template protection scheme[39], [38],
[42], [13]. Given the wide popularity of the Bloom-Filter based
template protection schemes, we identify the key limitations of the
Bloom-Filter based template protection, especially in scaling up to
unconstrained iris template protection where a higher false accepts
and false rejects are noted. Secondly, the previously proposed
approaches have limited the validation to iris images captured in
NIR spectrum and no work has been reported in Visible Spectrum
(VIS) iris recognition. In an effort to address such limitations, we
present a new framework for template protection which not only
is able to scale up to unconstrained iris images, but also across
capture spectrum.
1 .2 Challenges and Our Contributions
From the number of works listed above it can be noted that most
of the works focus on constrained iris data captured in close
TABLE 1: State-of-art approaches for template protection in iris recognition
Previous Work Approach Contribution Dataset Type Database Accuracy
Yang and Verbauwhede [47]
Error Correcting Code (ECC)
based BTP
Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hochquenghem (BCH)
code of a random bit-stream
Constrained NIR Iris – –
Nandakumar and Jain [31]
Fuzzy-vault scheme to derive
private keys from iris patterns.
Fixed-length binary vector
representation of iriscode
into an unordered set
representation
Constrained NIR CASIA v1 Iris –
Maiorana et al., [28]
Turbo codes with soft-
decoding for iris
High performance in terms of
both verification rates and se-
curity
Constrained NIR CASIA-Iris V4 database –
Zhang et al., [48]
Concatenated coding scheme
and bit masking scheme
A bit masking scheme was
proposed to minimize and ran-
domize the errors
Constrained Internal CASIA Interval 0.52% EER
Rathgeb et al. [39]
Bloom-filter based biometric
template protection
Alignment free template cre-
ation Constrained NIR CASIA-v3 Interval Iris 1.19 % EER
Rathgeb and Busch [41], [40]
Adaptive Bloom filter-based
transforms
The irreversible mixing trans-
form generating alignment-
free templates
Constrained NIR IITD Iris Dataset 0.5% EER
Gomez-Barrero et al. [13]
Generic framework for gener-
ating an irreversible represen-
tation
Feature level fusion of differ-
ent biometrics (face and iris)
to a single protected template
Constrained NIR IITD Iris Database version 1.0 0.5% EER
Lai et al [26]
Cancellable iris template with
Jaccard similarity matcher
Low error rate and attack re-
sistant Constrained NIR CASIA v3 iris database 0.16% EER
IITD Iris Dataset, 0% EER for NIR,
This work [23] Morton-Filter Very low error Constrained and (NIR and VIS) 15 % EER on VIS
Template Protection rate and high attack Unconstrained CASIA v4 Distance Dataset (Equivalent to
resistances UBIRIS v1, UBIRIS v2 Unprotected domain)
3cooperation. While the practical iris recognition systems need to
operate at within a stipulated time, they often relax the constraints
for the capture. Under such relaxed capture conditions, the iris
recognition suffers from number of quality degrading factors such
as motion blur, reflection from ambient light, reflection of eye-
lashes on iris and partial iris capture due to partial closure of lids
[15], [34], [5], [6]. These factors are further aggravated in the iris-
on-the move systems where not just the quality is impacted, but
also the details of the captured iris by itself is substantially low. As
observed from the Figure 2, the capture in unconstrained settings
results in quality par-below the one captured in constrained and
fully-cooperative scenario. Secondly, the capture of iris images in
Near-Infra-Red (NIR) results in superior iris features while the
capture in visible spectrum results in iris features that are often
with even lower iris pattern details.
Fig. 2: The degradation of iris quality from constrained capture to
iris-on-move capture. (a) presents the iris captured in constrained
setting as provided in IITD v1 Iris Dataset [25] and (b) presents the
iris captured from on-the-move scenario as provided by UBIRIS
Dataset [36]. (b) and (d) represent the corresponding segmented
and normalized iris image for (a) and (c).
Such inherent challenges arising out of capture problems
pose challenge in obtaining a reliable representation of iris codes
subsequent to feature extraction (for instance, 2D/1D Gabor fea-
tures). The direct impact of such inferior quality iriscodes can
be witnessed through low performance reported in many earlier
works [15], [34], [5], [6]. A number of strategies have been
proposed in earlier works to handle the problems of inferior
quality iris codes to improve the recognition performance [15],
[34], [5], [6]. The sub-optimal quality iris data can impact not only
the recognition accuracy but also the subsequent operations based
on iris code, specifically iris template protection. This specific
aspect of degraded performance of template protection schemes
with Bloom-Filter due to unconstrained iris capture and inferior
quality iriscodes was noted and illustrated in our recent work[23].
With a detailed analysis of Bloom-filter based template protec-
tion for iris recognition in unconstrained setting, we established
the limitations of classical Bloom-filter based template protection
in scaling for unconstrained setting where the data is significantly
noisy. As it can be noted from the Figure 1, the iriscodes in
unconstrained iris capture from CASIA.v4 distance dataset [1]
results in unreliable iriscodes that differ for the same subject
across captures. This implicitly impacts the Bloom Filter based
template protection where similar locations are set in the protected
templates leading to high number of false accepts. High number
of false accepts therefore defeats the purpose of high security in
iris biometrics systems.
Driven by such problem, specifically for creation of protected
templates even under noisy representation, we present a new
approach employing the recently proposed Morton Filters [3].
Morton Filters introduces several key improvements to currently
well employed Bloom-Filters simply by creating multiple buckets
with a predetermined logic. With such an architecture, Morton
Filter approach supports compressed format that permits a sparse
template that can be stored compactly in memory. Further, the
multi-bucket architecture of Morton Filters reduces the False
Accepts and False Rejects considerably over the traditional Bloom
Filters with minimal computational overhead. Motivated by the
architecture facilitating such improvements over Bloom Filters
[2], [3], we propose a new protected template creation mechanism
using the Morton Filter approach on iriscodes.
In this version of our work, we extend the Morton Filter based
iris template protection by specifically modelling inter-class and
intra-class distribution of iris codes which is known to provide
well separated comparison scores following statistical distribution
motivated by earlier works [6], [5]. The key motivation is to
explore class distribution to make the template protection roust
for unconstrained iris capture which typically suffers performance
degradation in general iris recognition [8], [44], [15], [34], [8],
[17]. We specifically exploit the inter-class and intra-class dis-
tribution to extract robust iriscodes to the benefit of template
protection such that multiple buckets can be easily composed.
Such buckets facilitate optimal template creation through Morton
Filter principles. To this extent, we employ low rank iriscodes that
correspond to relatively non-noisy iriscodes, discriminable codes
that differ from iriscodes of other subjects and a combination code
using both representation of iriscodes.
Our initial assertion of such an idea was validated in our
earlier work[23] where the biometric performance was signifi-
cantly improved by optimizing both the false accepts and false
rejects simultaneously. While noting the previous works limiting
to constrained iris data [38], [42], [13], [14], we validated the
approach slightly unconstrained data [23]. In this work, we take
a step further to extend the approach to truly unconstrained iris
recognition. Further, the approach is validated on the visible
spectrum iris recognition through an evaluation on large scale
public visible spectrum iris database. The key contributions of
this extended work therefore are listed as below:
• Proposes a new approach for template protection of iris
codes using Morton Filters in a multi-bucket approach ex-
ploiting various stable bits and discriminable bits within the
iriscodes[23].
• Presents the key idea behind modelling the intra-class and
inter-class distribution to the advantage of biometric template
protection along with the theoretical background.
• An extensive analysis of the proposed approach is presented
to validate the scalability of proposed approach by employing
both constrained and unconstrained iris databases. Further,
the approach is analyzed on both NIR spectrum and VIS
spectrum iris recognition. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work attempting to study the template protection
scheme on large scale unconstrained iris database in both VIS
and NIR spectrum.
• Additionally, the security analysis using unlinkability frame-
work is provided to validate the applicability of proposed
template protection scheme while benchmarking it with the
Bloom-Filter based template protection scheme.
In the remainder of this paper, we present the principles and
theory of Morton Filters in Section 2 . Section 3 presents the
4approach of template protection using Morton Filters mechanism.
Section 4 provides the experimental results along with the details
of databases employed for evaluation. Section 5 discusses the
security analysis for linkability issues followed by the conclusions
and potential future works in Section 7 .
2 MORTON FILTERS
Morton Filters were originally proposed for the Approximate Set
Membership Data Structures (ASMDSs) in the field of computing
to make the storage efficient1 [3]. Specifically, Morton Filters
were designed to facilitate the lookups, insertions, and deletions
unlike the Bloom-Filters which do not allow the dynamic changes.
The key improvements come from the introduction of compressed
format permitting logically sparse filter and leveraging metadata
to prune unnecessary memory accesses. As a third major im-
provement over the Bloom-Filters, Morton-Filters heavily bias
insertions through the use of a single hash function for primary
bucket while allowing multiple buckets. As it can be deduced,
Bloom-Filters set the same bit over and again for multiple various
entries due to inherent design limitation of using single bucket
operation. A significant drawback of this is that it does not allow
efficient querying of false negatives due to absence of locality
of reference[3]. Although, this can be handled by adding extra
number of hash functions, at a particular point the hash functions
by themselves will overshadow actual length of original data or
have high collision rate when few hashes are employed. Another
alternative is to move the set bits to a different location based on
the empty slots by constant look-up. While the former strategy can
reduce false rejects, the later strategy can result in high number
of false accepts both of which are not ideal in any operational
scenario. This being the primary reasons, Morton-Filters formu-
lated the multi-bucket approach to handle the problem efficiently.
Through realization of multiple buckets set membership can be
queried effectively leading to lower false negatives and false
positives[3].
Thus, with the paradigm of multiple buckets (say for instance
H1, H2 . . . Hn) within the Morton-Filters, the primary bucket H1
is favoured heavily for insertions before proceeding with the rest of
buckets. For negative lookups, the Morton-Filter employs an Over-
flow Tracking Array (OTA), a simple bit vector that tracks when
data cannot be placed within H1 and moves to other available
buckets. Negative lookups only require accessing a single bucket
(i.e., OTA), in most cases even when the filter is heavily loaded.
This unique architecture makes the lookup (positive, false positive,
or negative) to access one bucket and at most 2 leading to query
efficiency of upto 50%[3].
In terms of implementation, Morton filters build upon the con-
cepts of the Bloom Filters which operate by employing k number
of hash representations corresponding to number of blocks. The
final representation T in a Bloom-Filter of a predetermined size is
first initialized to 0. For every chosen block within n number of
blocks, a particular location x, y is set which corresponds to the
final hashed representation template T .
T (x, y) = 1 if hnk = (y) (1)
for a given column x in chosen block n (2)
While in the Morton Filters, filling of each bucket relies on the
fingerprint of previous hash value as denoted by Eqn. 2 and the
1. An ASMDS like a set data structure answers set membership queries (i.e.,
is an item e an element of the set S?)
output position within a new template given T (x, y) is set to 1.
If the T1(x, y) is already set, another bit at a different location is
set within a new template corresponding to T2(x, y). The process
progresses for the number of designed buckets if all the bits in the
previous buckets are already set. A detailed theory of the Morton-
Filters is further provided in the original article [3] and we limit
at this point to diverge into the details of how Morton-Filters are
employed for template protection in the upcoming sections.
3 MORTON FILTER IRIS TEMPLATE PROTECTION
Intrigued by the design considerations of multi-bucket approach
proposed in Morton-Filters to handle the false accepts and false
rejects (or false positives and false negatives), we adapt the
framework for template protection of iriscodes. The details of the
template protection scheme based on Morton-Filters are presented
in this section.
3 .1 Morton Filters for Iris Template Protection
While the implementation of the Bloom-Filter based template
protection for iris recognition is relatively straight forward, it has
to be noted that Morton-Filter template protection differs in certain
aspects. The core of Morton-Filters relies on having multiple
buckets and in the very least case, more than one bucket is needed
as discussed in previous sections. It can therefore be deduced
that to make the template protection compatible to Morton-Filters,
number of buckets need to be designed for iriscodes. A trivial idea
for this can be to divide the iriscodes into blocks and thereafter
consider them as separate buckets. While this may seem feasible at
the first instance, it has to be noted that the iris imaging is impacted
number of factors and thereby resulting in unreliable blocks for
certain segments of the iris/iriscodes. Secondly, the iriscodes do
not provide any correlational factors across different blocks due to
the random structure of iris owing to biological factors[7]. Thus
a more apprehensible manner of bucket formulations remains the
first task. Therefore, we first focus on principles for suitable bucket
design in an effort to obtain optimal templates.
3 .1.1 Bucket Creation for Iriscodes
Within various deployed iris recognition systems, it is commonly
observed that iris images are captured in multiple attempts or as a
stream of video. The general idea behind using multiple captures
or video of any particular iris is to obtain the non-noisy part
of iriscodes to minimize the error in comparison. In an analogy
within the signal (or image) representation, the non-noisy iriscodes
lie within the subspace of the complete iriscodes consisting of
both noisy and non-noisy parts. Thus, obtaining the subspace
corresponding to non-noisy iriscode can provide us with at-least
one bucket for the realization of Morton-Filters based template
protection.
For k capture attempts of an iris image, the iriscodes (I)
consisting of noisy and non-noisy parts can be represented as:
I = [I1,I2, . . .Ik] (3)
where each iriscode is of dimension x, y pixels. Given the task at
hand is to obtain a non-noisy iriscodes from the complete iriscode,
it can be represented as composite of non-noisy part and noisy part
as below:
Im = Sm + Em (4)
5where Sm is low-rank non-noisy part and Em is sparse error part
within the iriscode corresponding to noisy data. As the capture
conditions can vary across multiple captures, it can be easily
deduced that both non-noisy part and the noisy part of iris code
can vary in spatial locations. Thus, to obtain a stable non-noisy
subspace of iriscode, one can explore multiple approaches such
as obtaining Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or a median
weighted approach [30], [16]. Given the recent formulation for
obtaining the superior non-noisy subspace using tensor formula-
tion from our recent work[22], we employ the same in this work.
Thus, by stacking the iriscodes obtained from multiple (k)
capture attempts, a tensor of iriscodes can be represented as
I ∈ Rx×y×k. The tensor formulation thus leads to easy recovery
within the tensor space which corresponds to common bits across
iriscodes across capture attempts. In an alternative interpretation,
the solution to low-rank recovery of tensor space provides the
iriscodes which are relatively non-noisy. Recovering non-noisy
iriscodes from the tensor space thus translates to obtaining Sm,
low-rank non-noisy component and Em, sparse error component
(i.e., low tubal rank component [21]) from set of noisy iriscodes
represented as I = Sm + Em ∈ Rx×y×k:
min
S, E
‖S‖∗ + λ‖E‖1, s.t. I = S+ E, (5)
where ‖S‖∗ is the tensor nuclear norm. However, the challenge of
obtaining a sensible solution still remains in Eqn. 5 and in order to
address this challenge, we express the λ = 1/
√
max(x, y)× k
[21] such that non-noisy subspace of iriscodes can be obtained.
Given the formulation in Eqn. 5 and a reasonable expression of
λ, we employ the software package provided by [27] to solve
the Eqn.5 with no additional parameter tuning. Thereby, with the
obtained non-noisy subspace, we derive one bucket (B1k) of kth
iriscode for a particular subject by simply using it as a weight map
as given below:
B1k = Ik ∗ S (6)
While the first bucket is created from the above steps,
the Morton-Filter architecture needs at-least another additional
bucket. Thus, we explore the intra-class discriminablity of
iriscodes exploring the findings from statistical trials provided in
earlier works[5]. Under the assumption that binomial distribution
of iriscodes, all the bits within the iriscodes corresponding to 0
and 1 are equi-probable and randomly distributed[5]. Thus, if
the probability of ith bit equalling to 1 is given by p∗i and the
probability of ith bit equalling to 0 is given by q∗i , it can be safely
written that p∗i + q
∗
i = 1 for the i
th bit within an iriscode. Thus,
discriminablity of a particular bit di for a particular iriscode from
the rest of the iriscodes can be formulated as:
di = piq
∗
i + qip
∗
i (7)
where pi is the probability of ith bit equalling to 1 and qi is the
probability of ith bit equalling to 0 for any other iriscode [16] in
an ideal case. Expressing, q∗i = 1− p∗i , the Eqn 7 becomes
di = (1− 2pi)p∗i + p∗i (8)
It can therefore be noted that if the pi = 0.5, the di = 0.5 and
the implication is that intra-class value of the ith bit is highly
uncertain being equi-probable. An alternative formulation leads to
the fact discriminablity di of one subject will be lower when the
Fig. 3: Morton Filtering based protected template creation.
6ith bit of rest of the subjects are more likely to be 1. Given the
number of iriscodes for a user available under multiple capture, the
Eqn 7 can be used to derive discriminablity for each subject. As
the discriminable maps can be estimated for different k iriscodes,
a stable discriminable map D for a particular subject can be
obtained by a normalized average of n iriscodes.
Dk =
dk −min{dk=1...n}
max{dk=1...n} −min{dk=1...n}
The second bucket B2k for an iriscode k for a particular subject
based on the discriminable map can therefore be created by simply
weighting it with the iriscode:
B2k = Ik ∗Dk (9)
3 .2 Morton-Filter Template Protection Framework for
Iris Recognition
As discussed in the previous sections, Morton-Filter architecture
can be used with at-least two buckets. However, given the limited
number of hash functions employed to activate the bits in the
protected template, noise factors that may occasionally impact
the unreliability of the stable bits (despite bit selection) and
discriminablity of the bits across iriscodes, we propose a third
and auxiliary bucket that can be derived from combining both
the buckets (Refer Eqn. 6 and Eqn. 9). Thus, bucket B3k from an
iriscode k can be expressed as:
B3k = Ik ∗D (10)
While the designed buckets should be heavily activated in ac-
cordance to the principles of Morton-Filters, the second bucket
or subsequent buckets are sparsely activated. Thus, we consider
a different order by making the combined map iriscode as the
biasing bucket (or first bucket i.e., (B3k)) under the fact that a
portion of bits commonly present in stability and discriminablity
bucket can be activated simultaneously. Our assertion is that such
a change of order helps in minimizing the false accepts and
false rejects. Further, we activate bits in other buckets (stable
and discriminable bits) in a regulated manner by employing a
bijective XOR operation (indicated by ⊕). Thus, the sequence of
the operations in template creation for an iriscode k can be listed
as below:
T 1k = 0 //Template Stable IC
T 2k = 0 //Template Discriminable IC
T 3k = 0 //Template Combined IC
i3k = Hash(B
3
k(i))
i2k =
(
i3k ⊕Hash(B2k(i))
)
i1k =
(
i2k ⊕Hash(B1k(i))
)
T 3k = 1 if i
3
k == 1
T 2k = 1 iff i
2
k == 1 && T
3
k == 1
T 1k = 1 iff i
1
k == 1 && T
3
k == 1 && T
2
k == 1 (11)
where i1 and i2 are indices to be set in two separate buckets.
The complete framework for Morton-Filter template based
protected template creation is depicted in the Figure 3. As with
a regular iris recognition system, the framework begins with the
normalized iris image which is further employed to extract the
iriscode. For the sake of simplicity and backward compatibility,
we employ the 1D Log Gabor representation owing to the fact
that many early works on iris template protection have employed
the same. While the architecture can improve the performance of
the template protection, we note that this may suffer from the
same challenge of linkability issues as indicated earlier [14]. In
order to mitigate any such potential linkability issues, we adapt
the private keys for creation of protected templates as described
in recent work [13], [4] along with a bijective function on all the
three buckets such that the unique bits within the iris template is
retained.
As noted from Eqn 11, the bits in the final template are
activated based on bits of other buckets. Such an architecture not
only results in robust templates, but also makes the guessability
attacks harder if not fully eliminate given only sparse number
of bits are activated across the protected iris template. As it can
be seen from the Figure 3, the protected template is created by
iteratively checking the bit location indicated by hash function
and set if it is empty. If not, the hash value is carried forward
to next bucket by determining the location based on the values in
block under consideration and the previously obtained location for
earlier bucket. It can be observed that fewer number of bits are set
in the last bucket while more number of bits are set in the first
bucket from Figure 3.
Combined Map Stable Map Discriminable Map
Combined Template Stable Template Discriminable Template
Proposed - XOR Proposed - Interleaved (IV)
Fig. 4: Multiple templates of iris code using low rank non-
noisy representation, discriminative representation, and combined
representation of the same binarized iris code (partial iris code)
for a sample iris from IITD Iris Dataset [49]
3 .2.1 Two Variants of Template Protection Scheme
As observed from the Eqn 11, it can be deduced that the final
protected template can be obtained from T 1k , T
2
k , T
3
k , one can
think of using all the three templates. Thus, the first variant we
propose is the Interleaved Variant (IV) of all the three independent
templates for an iriscode k as indicated below:
T IVk = T
1
k ||T 2k ||T 3k (12)
In order to diffuse the arrangement of bits, we further introduce a
random ordered interleaving within the above Eqn 12 to avoid any
correlation based guessability attacks.
In the second variant, we simply employ a bijective XOR
function to eliminate the bits within the protected template which
are not common across all the three individual protected templates.
The operation can therefore be given by:
TXORk = T
1
k ⊕ T 2k ⊕ T 3k (13)
The two variants of the proposed template protection can be
further seen in the illustrated Figure 4. As observed, the XOR
7variant of the template protection provides the template of the
size that is equal to the three independent templates resulting in
a compact protected template size. As a second observation, it
can be evidently seen that the size of the template triples for the
IV version of the protected template. As a direct implication of
this, one can deduce the high performance of the IV version as
compared to it’s XOR variant.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We present the experimental evaluation on four different datasets
and the corresponding results along with an analysis of the
results. The first set of experiments relate to constrained iris
acquisition by employing IITD Iris Database version 1.0 [25]
and the second set of experiments relate to unconstrained iris
acquisition using CASIA.v4 distance dataset [1]. While the former
is captured in highly cooperative setting, the latter is captured at
various stand-off distance resulting in non-ideal iris images with
significant degradation. Both of these datasets are captured in
NIR spectrum mimicking the deployment iris systems. In another
set of experiments, we employ the iris images captured in the
visible spectrum by employing the UBIRIS v1[35] and UBIRIS
v2[36] dataset. The key motivation behind such experiments on the
unconstrained visible spectrum iris data is to evaluate scalability of
the proposed approach for capture domain independence. Further,
this set of experiments also establishes the robustness on degraded
data stemming from unconstrained capture setting with significant
degradations.
We further provide the comparison of performance from
proposed approach against unprotected version and protected
template using Bloom-Filters. For each of iriscode in unprotected
domain and protected domain, we employ a simple Hamming
Distance measure [6] to obtain the compare score.
Performance Metrics
All the results in Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curves along
with indication of Genuine Match Rate (GMR) where GMR is (1
- False Non Match Rate (FNMR)) at a False Match Rate of 0.01%.
In addition to the DET graphs, we also present the results in Error
Rate (EER%) to indicate the symmetric error rates.
4 .1 IITD Iris Database version 1.0
IITD Iris Database version 1.0 [25] is a constrained iris database
consisting of data captured from 224 subjects and 5 images per
iris. We employ the set of left iris images in the lines of earlier
work and to provide fair comparison to earlier works [42], [4].
Thus, in our work, we employ data from 1120 iriscodes from
224 subjects with 5 iris codes per subject. We employ 1D Log-
Gabor encoding [29] for the unprotected iris templates and the
subsequently, use the same encoding to obtain obtain protected
templates in the lines of earlier works on Bloom-filter based
template protection [39], [4], [13]. Further, it can be noted that
the our approach does not heavily depend on feature space and
thus allowing the freedom to employ any other binary encoding
scheme for iris feature encoding. In order to consistent with the
earlier works, we also present the comparison to earlier works[4],
[13], we present the results in various size of block widths
` ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32}.
TABLE 2: Results of proposed template protection schemes com-
pared to other schemes on IITD Iris Dataset.
5 Bits 10 Bits
Iris code EER GMR @ EER GMR @
0.01% FMR 0.01% FMR
Unprotected Log-Gabor 0,36 99,11 0,36 99,11
Protected
Bloom - 4 0,38 99,33 0,62 99,38
Bloom - 8 0,39 99,38 0,44 99,55
Bloom - 16 0,40 99,15 0,26 98,84
Bloom - 32 0,83 98,57 0,34 98,08
Interleaved Variant (IV)
Proposed - 4 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Proposed - 8 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Proposed - 16 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Proposed - 32 0.00 100.00 0.01 99.78
XOR Variant
Proposed - 4 0,00 100,00 5.89 64.62
Proposed - 8 0.00 100.00 2.34 90.63
Proposed - 16 0.00 100.00 1.42 94.98
Proposed - 32 0.01 99.67 1.10 96.32
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Fig. 5: Comparison of biometric performance using DET for IITD
Iris Dataset. Proposed approach is depicted with 4 blocks and
5 bits alongside similar configuration with Bloom-filter template
protection. It has to noted that the EER being close to 0 for
proposed approach, the curves do not appear on the DET curves.
4 .2 Results on IITD Iris Dataset
The empirical results of the proposed template protection scheme
along with the comparison to unprotected templates and protected
templates using Bloom Filter approach are presented in Table 2.
From the Table 2, the following observations can be made on the
proposed approach:
• The proposed approach is antagonistic to block size unlike
the approach based on Bloom Filter which is fairly robust
in smaller block sizes and degrades in performance with
increasing block size. A similar observation for Bloom-Filter
based template protection was reported in earlier work[4]
which noted the degradation of biometric with increasing
block width and higher bits within each blocks.
• A near ideal performance from proposed approach with IV
configuration is obtained due to the fact that the diversity of
the templates are high as the size of the template is thrice the
size of simple Bloom-Filter. One can therefore employ other
strategies such as bit compaction to obtain lower template
size to retain the performance and decrease the size of final
protected template.
• As anticipated, the compact size of XOR variant of the
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Fig. 6: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed template protection on CASIA v4 Distance dataset.
proposed approach results in moderate degradation in per-
formance. An introspection into this behaviour revealed the
fact that the XOR operation cancels out most of the bits if
they are not set across multiple individual templates created
from Morton Filters. When such a operation a carried out,
the collision of the bits across multiple protected templates
starts to happen. The collision rate along with the low
number of activated bits in final template jointly degrade the
performance in XOR variant.
The DET curves in Figure 5 depicts the performance of proposed
approach. Further, to illustrate the antagonistic nature of proposed
approach towards various block sizes, the DET curves are pre-
sented in Appendix in Figure B 1. As it can be noted, various
configurations of the proposed approach for a bit length of 5
provides near ideal performance for protected templates.
4 .3 CASIA V4 Distance Iris Dataset
Considering the earlier works focusing on the constrained iris
recognition, we evaluate the proposed approach on unconstrained
capture setting by employing CASIA.v4 distance dataset [1].
CASIA.v4 capture includes parts of the face image due to stand-
off distance of 3 meters in the acquisition setting from a total
of 142 subjects. Further, it has to be noted that the captured iris
images suffers from degradation unlike ideal iris images due to
blinking, occlusion due to eye-lids, specular reflection, presence of
eye-glasses and motion blur all leading to real-life iris acquisition.
We therefore employ classical Viola-Jones eye detector to detect
the eye region alone and then correct the errors manually for
any undetected/wrongly detected eye regions [45]. Further to eye
region localization, we segment and normalize the iris region using
[29] to derive the iris images of size 100 × 360 pixels. The iris
codes are further extracted using 1D Log − Gabor features for
the baseline evaluation [29].
4 .4 Results on CASIA v4 Distance Iris Dataset
Table 3 presents the results of proposed template protection along
Bloom Filter approach. Noting the low performance of naive
Bloom-Filter on CASIA v4 dataset, we also employ the stable
bits to extract the Bloom-Filter template. Specifically, we employ
the Eqn 6 provided in the Section 3 .1.1 to extract the stable bits
from iriscode. As it can be noted from Table 3, there is an marginal
performance improvement over naive Bloom-Filter templates but
much below the required operational performance in a practical
TABLE 3: Results from proposed approach on CASIA v4 Dataset
5 Bits 10 Bits
Configurations EER GMR @ EER GMR @
0.01% FMR 0.01% FMR
Bloom Filter (Naive)
Bloom - 4 36.24 0.65 38.52 0.20
Bloom - 8 40.00 0.24 41.65 0.08
Bloom - 16 41.70 0.24 43.77 0.08
Bloom - 32 40.07 0.08 44.87 0.12
Bloom Filter (Low-rank non-noisy/stable Iris Codes)
Bloom - 4 27.12 29.27 31.87 14.63
Bloom - 8 31.83 11.38 36.09 4.07
Bloom - 16 34.31 8.94 39.92 2.44
Bloom - 32 32.92 18.29 42.12 3.66
Interleaved (IV)
Proposed - 4 0.13 99.51 0.53 96.63
Proposed - 8 0.37 98.37 2.40 82.07
Proposed - 16 0.04 99.96 1.96 86.87
Proposed - 32 0.04 99.88 1.92 88.66
XOR
Proposed - 4 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Proposed - 8 6.27 52.93 6.61 39.88
Proposed - 16 3.40 69.88 11.21 18.70
Proposed - 32 2.11 86.18 8.37 27.93
biometric system. Further, in the lines of our experiments on IITD
Iris dataset, we also present the results on both IV and XOR
variant of the proposed approach on CASIA v4 dataset. The clear
improvement of the proposed approach can be seen from the Table
3 and impelled by such a improvement, we note the following
points:
• While in the case of Bloom-Filter templates, same set of bits
are activated due to noisy nature of the iriscodes. This in turn
results in sub-optimal protected template results validating
the motivation and initial assertion for this work. It can be
noted from Fig. 1, that for the iris template across sessions for
the same subject, bloom filter approach results in dissimilar
protected templates for the same subject across different
captures leading to a significant false rejects.
• While in the proposed approach, the creation of multiple
buckets and further activation of bits based on the predecessor
buckets leads to a unique template even for different captures
for a same subject. Adding the uniqueness of the template,
both Interleaved variant (IV) makes the templates unique due
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Fig. 7: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed template protection on UBIRIS v1 dataset.
to large size and the XOR variant eliminates the inconsistent
bits. Both of these variants further lead to lower false rejects
needing further investigation into design considerations of
Morton-Filters for template protection.
• Despite the degradations of iriscodes owing the uncon-
strained setting, it can be noted that the proposed approach
on CASIA.v4 distance dataset [1] is significantly stable in IV
variant of proposed approach while the XOR variant produces
the templates that have slightly higher collisions.
We further present the DET curves of proposed approach as shown
in Figure 6 for both variants and do not present the DET curves
for the Bloom-Filter templates owing to the low performance.
Supporting our initial assertion, the proposed approach through
employing multiple buckets results in lower false accepts and false
rejects as shown in Figure 6.
4 .5 UBIRIS v1 Dataset
We further evaluate the proposed approach on the visible spec-
trum iris recognition, especially captured in unconstrained setting.
To this end, we evaluate the proposed approach on UBIRIS.v1
database composed of 1877 images collected from 241 persons in
two distinct sessions in visible spectrum at a stand-off distance.
Unlike the other existing public and free databases for iris recog-
nition, UBIRIS v1 incorporates images with several noise factors,
thus permitting the evaluation of robustness proposed template
protection scheme. The enrollment set consists of minimized
noise factors, specially those relative to reflections, luminosity
and contrast, having installed image capture framework inside
a dark room as compared to the second session. While in the
second session, the iris images are captured with the introduced
natural luminosity factor. Thus, we employ the images from
the first session for the enrolment template creation and second
session for template verification. Given the database has number
of noise factors, we have eliminated the images that have severe
segmentation errors and completely off-angled iris images. The
segmentation and the normalization of the iris region is performed
using the recent approach of Total-variation based segmentation
[49] to derive the iris images of size 100 × 360 pixels which is
then used to extract the features by employing 1D Log −Gabor
representation.
4 .6 Results on UBIRIS v1 Iris Dataset
For the sake of brevity, we present the result of proposed approach
on the UBIRIS v1 iris dataset in the Figure 7 and we do not report
the performance of Bloom-Filter based template protection due
to non-ideal performance. As it can be observed from the DET
curves, the proposed approach has certain loss in terms of the
biometric performance as compared to the unprotected templates
as anticipated. Nevertheless, the performance is comparable in the
IV version of the proposed approach as seen in Fig.7a. While a
severe degree of performance loss is seen across the XOR variant,
it is also interesting to note that the XOR version with a block
length of 4 with 5 bits is performing close to unprotected template.
This observation is consistent to our earlier observations where we
have noted that the lower block widths perform superior as com-
pared to the larger block widths. Further, the Receiver Operating
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Fig. 8: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed template protection on UBIRIS v2 dataset.
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Fig. 9: Unlinkability metrics obtained for proposed template protection scheme for various configurations
Characteristics (ROC) to indicate the biometric performance is
provided in supplementary material in Fig. C 2.
4 .7 UBIRIS v2 Dataset
We further evaluate the proposed approach on the visible spectrum
iris recognition captured in unconstrained setting using the second
set - UBIRIS v2. Similar to UBIRIS v1, this dataset has data
with various non-ideal iris images, imaging distances, subject
perspectives and lighting conditions. Further, the iris data is
captured under both natural and artificial lighting sources along
with a session interval of a weeks between the enrolment and
probe. It has to be further noted that in the second session, the
location and orientation of the acquisition device and artificial
light sources was changed increasing the diversity in capture
conditions with a total of 261 subjects totalling to 522 irises. The
segmentation and the normalization of the iris region is performed
using Total-variation based segmentation [49] to derive the iris
images of size 100 × 360 pixels and then extract the features
using 1D Log −Gabor representation.
4 .8 Results on UBIRIS v2 Iris Dataset
Similar to the results obtained on UBIRIS v1 dataset, the results
obtained on the UBIRIS v2 iris dataset is presented in Figure 8.
The observations correlate to earlier observations and a slight
degradation in performance can be noted as compared to the
unprotected domain indicating the applicability of the proposed
approach. It has to be noted that results of Bloom-Filter based
template protection is not reported on this dataset due to non-ideal
biometric performance.
4 .9 Fine Tuned Experiments on UBIRIS v2 Iris Dataset
Seeking an answer to the low performance of the protected
templates, we conducted an additional experiment where the
segmentation masks were employed prior to deriving the stable
and discriminable code corresponding to protected templates from
iriscodes. As the masks eliminate the segmentation errors and
thereby provide first level of reliable bits, our assertion was
that such a refined iriscodes would improve the performance of
proposed template protection. In order to validate the assertion, we
report the following DET as show in the Figure 10. As seen from
the Figure 10, the performance of protected template increases
through the use of the masks prior to creation of multiple buckets.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS : UNLINKABILITY
We present the security analysis to demonstrate the unlinkability
of the proposed template protection using the recent Unlinkability
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40
0.1
0.2
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
40
False Match Rate (in %)
Fa
ls
e
N
on
-M
at
ch
R
at
e
(i
n
%
)
Combined Code - Unprotected
Morton Template - 4
Morton Template - 8
Morton Template - 16
Morton Template - 32
Fig. 10: Performance of multiple configurations with fine-tuned
approach of proposed template protection on UBIRIS v2 dataset.
Analysis Framework [11]. Under this framework, we measure the
similarity of the mated imposter distribution versus non-mated
imposter distribution. To maintain the terseness, we present the
results on IITD Iris dataset in Figure 9 where a high degree of
unlinkability can be observed along with the unlinkability metric
by Dsys↔ . The lower D
sys
↔ indicates superior unlinkability. Further,
one can observe the consistent unlinkability across different con-
figurations for varying blocks and varying bits.
6 FUTURE WORKS
Although the preliminary analysis of the security implications is
carried out for unlinkability, this work has not investigated the
potential threats with advanced attacks. While it can be noted
that the analysis carried out for Bloom-Filter reliability can be
generalized to the proposed approach and theoretical proof can be
borrowed from the recent works [12], [13], it will be interesting
to investigate the newer attacks. In the future works, we intend to
analyse the robustness of proposed attacks towards such attacks.
In the second direction, we shall explore the proposed approach
for the other modalities to preserve the privacy of the biometric
data.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have addressed the problem of template protection for iris
recognition in this work, specifically, we presented a novel
approach for template protection employing Morton Filters on
constrained and unconstrained iriscodes. Exploiting the intra-class
and inter-class distribution of iriscodes, we have designed multiple
buckets to realize Morton-Filter based template protection. The
proposed approach has been evaluated for both performance and
linkability challenges using four publicly available iris databases
11
captured in NIR spectrum and VIS spectrum. Although these
empirical validation on NIR domain demonstrate the feasibility
and applicability of proposed approach, we have evaluated the ap-
proach on the unconstrained iriscodes captured in visible spectrum
to measure the scalability and robustness. Along with providing
security, the loss in the performance is observed to be marginal
in visible spectrum iriscodes owing to noisy nature of images.
The approach being robust in comparison to Bloom Filter, can be
applied to other modalities with suitable adaptations in the future
works.
REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH
In order to facilitate the reproducible research, we intend to make
the code of the proposed approach publicly available along with
this article. Details on availing the code shall be provided in the
final version of the manuscript.
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APPENDIX
A STATE-OF-ART REVIEW FOR IRIS TEMPLATE PROTECTION
In this section we provide a brief overview of the state-of-art template protection schemes proposed and employed for the iris
recognition. This section is supplementary to Table 1 with specifics of previously proposed approaches.
• Yang and Verbauwhede [47] proposed a iris template protection approach by employing Error Correcting Code (ECC)
cryptographic technique with the reliable bits selection to improve the verification accuracy. In their work, Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hochquenghem (BCH) code of a random bit-stream was introduced to eliminate the considerable differences between the features
extracted from different scans of irises such that template protection was scheme reliable. The experiments were conducted on a a
subset of CASIA iris data 2.
• Nandakumar and Jain [31] proposed another framework based on fuzzy-vault scheme to derive private keys from iris patterns. In
the same work, they also proposed to fuse multiple biometric modalities, specifically fingerprint and iris. A salting transformation
based on a transformation key was employed to indirectly convert the fixed-length binary vector representation of iriscode into
an unordered set representation and further secured using the fuzzy vault. The performance for the iris template protection was
reported on CASIA iris image database v1.0 consisting of 108 different eyes with 7 images per eye collected over two sessions
and one image from each session was used for evaluation.
• Maiorana et al., [28] proposed a template protection framework inspired by the digital modulation paradigm where the properties
of modulation constellations and turbo codes with soft-decoding were exploited to design a system. The approach was tested on
the Interval subset of the CASIA-IrisV4 database where high performance in terms of both verification rates and security was
reported.
• Zhang et al., [48] proposed a concatenated coding scheme and bit masking scheme to construct an iris cryptosystem. The
concatenated coding scheme was proposed to embed long keys into the iris data and concatenated code combined with Reed-
Solomon code and convolutional code. Further, a bit masking scheme was proposed to minimize and randomize the errors to make
the error pattern more suitable for the coding scheme. The iris cryptosystem reported a FRR of 0.52% with the key length of 938
bits on a internal database of 128 iris images captured across 3 different sessions.
• Rathgeb et al. [39] proposed the popular Bloom-filter based biometric template protection. The iris codes were processed through
K-hashes resulting in the protected templates through transformation. While the framework was later reported to be weak against
linkability attacks, [14], the same was fixed by adding the private keys as proposed in [12]. The improved approach was evaluated
on BioSecure Multimodal Database to demonstrate the robustness towards linkability and reversibility.
• Rathgeb and Busch [41], [40] proposed a framework based on adaptive Bloom filter-based transforms that were applied in order
to mix binary iris biometric templates at feature level, where iris-codes are obtained from both eyes of a single subject. The
irreversible mixing transform generating alignment-free templates obscured information present in different iris-codes. Further,
the proposed transform was parameterized to achieve unlinkability resulting in implementing cancelable multi-biometrics. The
experiments on IITD Iris Database version 1.0 resulted in EER below 0.5% for different feature extraction methods and fusion
scenarios.
• Rathgeb et al. [38] further proposed a generic framework for generating an irreversible representation of multiple biometric
templates extending the framework of adaptive Bloom filters from earlier work[41]. The technique enabled a feature level fusion
of different biometrics (face and iris) to a single protected template, improving privacy protection compared to the corresponding
systems based on a single biometric trait.
• Lai et al [26] recently proposed a new scheme to generate cancellable iris template with Jaccard similarity matcher by modifying
the of Min-hashing to strengthen the privacy security in Indexing-First-One (IFO) hashing. The proposed approach was evaluated
on CASIA v3 iris database and reported to result in 0.16% Equal Error Rate (EER). Further, it is worth noting that the approach
is reported to be resistant against Single Hash Attack, Multi-Hash Attack, Attack via record multiplicity and Pre-image attack.
Unlike many previous works, this work also reported the unlinkability and revocability analysis on the proposed approach.
2. Details on the dataset and number of images are not provided in the article.
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B DET CURVES CORRESPONDING TO PROPOSED APPROACH AND INVARIANCE TO BLOCK SIZE IN NIR
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Fig. B 1: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed Morton Filter on IITD Iris dataset for a bit length of 5 bits.
C RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC (ROC) CURVES CORRESPONDING TO PROPOSED AP-
PROACH
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Fig. C 2: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed template protection on UBIRIS v1 dataset.
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Fig. C 3: Performance of multiple configurations for proposed template protection on UBIRIS v2 dataset.
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D UNLINKABILITY ANALYSIS
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Fig. D 4: Unlinkability metrics obtained for proposed template protection scheme for various configurations
